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Abstract
The Spohnian paradigm of ranking functions is in many respects like an order-of-magnitude reverse of subjective probability
theory. Unlike probabilities, however, ranking functions are only indirectly—via a pointwise ranking function on the underlying
set of possibilities W—defined on a field of propositions A over W . This research note shows under which conditions ranking
functions on a field of propositionsA over W and rankings on a language L are induced by pointwise ranking functions on W and
the set of models for L, ModL, respectively.
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1. Introduction: Pointwise ranking functions
The Spohnian paradigm of ranking functions [16,17] is in many respects like an order-of-magnitude reverse of
subjective probability theory [9]. “Ranks represent degrees”—or rather: grades—“of disbelief” ([19]: 6). Whereas a
high probability indicates a high degree of belief, a high rank indicates a high grade of disbelief.
There are many parallels between probability theory and ranking theory [16,18], and in Footnote 22 of his [16]
Spohn “wonder[s] how far the mathematical analogy [of his ranking functions to probabilities] could be extend-
ed”.1 The starting point of this paper is one of the few places where ranking theory differs from subjective probability
theory as well as qualitative-logical approaches to the representation of epistemic states such as entrenchment order-
ings in belief revision theory: the domain on which these models are defined, that is, what they take to be the objects
of belief.
Unlike probabilities, ranking functions are only indirectly—via a pointwise ranking function on a non-empty set of
possibilities (possible worlds, models) W—defined on some finitary/σ -/complete field A over W , i.e., a set of subsets
of W containing the empty set and closed under complementation and finite/countable/arbitrary intersections. Let us
have a closer look.
E-mail address: franz@caltech.edu (F. Huber).
1 Ranking theory is very similar to possibility theory [5], and it would be highly desirable to know to what extent the results below also hold for
possibility measures. Unfortunately this goes beyond the scope of this research note.0004-3702/$ – see front matter  2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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least on ω ∈ W . A pointwise ranking function κ :W → N is extended to a function κ on a field A over W with range
N ∪ {∞} by defining, for each A ∈A,
κ(A) =
{
min{κ(ω): ω ∈ A}, if A = ∅,
∞, if A = ∅.
As will be seen below, it is useful to allow that some possibility ω ∈ W is sent to ∞, which amounts to ω being a
“virtually impossible possibility” (according to κ). In order to distinguish the more restricted notion of a pointwise
ranking function as defined above from the more liberal one allowing for virtually impossible possibilities, let us call
the former natural pointwise ranking functions (because the range of κ is restricted to the set of natural numbers N ).
Pointwise ranking functions κ are functions defined on a non-empty set of possibilities W that take natural numbers
or ∞ as values. They are extended to functions κ on a field A over W by stipulating that the rank of any non-empty
proposition A ∈A equals the minimum rank of the possibilities in A, i.e., κ(A) = min{κ(ω): ω ∈ A}, and the empty
proposition is sent to ∞.
In case W is a finite set of possibilities and A its powerset, every possibility corresponds to a proposition (viz.
the singleton containing it). But already when W is the set of all models ModL for a propositional language L
with infinitely many propositional variables and A is the field {Mod(α) ⊆ W : α ∈ L}, no possibility corresponds to
a proposition. Furthermore, one has to specify a ranking over uncountably many possibilities in order to assign a
positive finite rank to a single proposition. But clearly, we often have a definite opinion about a single proposition
(represented in terms of a sentence) even if we do not have an idea of what the underlying set of possibilities looks
like—let alone what our ranking over these possibilities might be. For instance, I strongly disbelieve that one can buy
a bottle of Schilcher for less than 1 Euro, though I lack the relevant enological vocabulary in order to know what
all the possibilities are. Indeed, it seems the underlying set of possibilities should not matter for my disbelief in this
proposition.
More generally, we should be able to theorize about our epistemic states even if all we are given is a ranking
over the sentences or propositions of some language or field, and we have no ranking over the underlying set of
possibilities. After all, what we as ordinary or scientific believers do have are plenty of beliefs and grades of belief
in various propositions—usually if not always via beliefs and grades of belief in sentences or other representations of
these propositions. When we want to attach ranks to sentences, pointwise ranking theory first has us specify a set of
possible worlds for the language the sentences are taken from; then we have to specify a ranking over these possible
worlds, which in turn induces a ranking over sets of possible worlds; and only then can we identify the rank of a
sentence with the rank of the proposition containing exactly the possible worlds making our sentence true.
This is a bit awkward. What one would like to do is to start with a ranking of the sentences in L, and then be able
to induce a pointwise ranking function on the corresponding set of possible worlds that yields the original ranking.
The question is whether this is always possible. In order to answer it, let us first define ranking functions on fields of
propositions and rankings on languages. (For a similar generalization of pointwise ranking functions see [21].)
2. Ranking functions and rankings on languages
(Finitely minimitive) ranking functions are functions  from a field A over a set of possibilities W into the set of
natural numbers extended by ∞2 such that for all A,B ∈A:
(1) (∅) = ∞;
(2) (W) = 0;
(3) (A∪B) = min{(A),(B)}.
If A is a σ -field/complete field,  is a σ -minimitive/completely minimitive ranking function iff, in addition to (1)–(3),
we have for every countable/possibly uncountable B ⊆ A:
2 One can also take the set of ordinal numbers smaller than or equal to some limit ordinal β and send ∅ to β , but we do not need this generality
here.
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In case A is finite, i.e., if A contains only finitely many elements, these distinctions collapse. According to (4), the
range of ranking functions has to be well-ordered. Therefore N is a natural choice. A ranking function  on A is
a pre-ranking iff  is a finitely minimitive ranking function on A such that

(⋃
B
)
= min{(A): A ∈ B}
for every countable B ⊆ A such that ⋃B ∈ A. A ranking function  is regular iff (A) < (∅) for every non-empty
A ∈A. The conditional ranking function (· | ·) :A×A→ N ∪ {∞} based on the ranking function  :A→ N ∪ {∞}
is defined such that for all A,B ∈A with B = ∅,
(5) (B | A) =
{
(B ∩A)− (A), if (A) < ∞,
0, if (A) = ∞.
The second clause says that, conditional on a (virtually) impossible proposition, no non-tautological proposition is
believed in . Goldszmidt and Pearl ([9]: 63) define (B | A) = ∞ for A = ∅, which means that, conditional on the
impossible proposition, every proposition is maximally believed in . We further stipulate that (∅ | A) = ∞ for every
A ∈A, which completes the definition of a conditional ranking function and ensures that (· | A) :A→ N ∪ {∞} is a
ranking function.
If the function κ :A→ N ∪ {∞} is induced by a (natural) pointwise ranking function κ :W → N , κ is a (regular
and) completely minimitive ranking function. The converse is not true. The triple A = 〈W,A, 〉 with W a set of
possibilities, A a finitary/σ -/complete field over W , and  :A→ N ∪ {∞} a ranking function is called a finitary/σ -
/complete ranking space. A is called regular iff  is regular, and A is called natural iff  is induced by some natural
pointwise ranking function κ .
A proposition A ∈ A is believed in  iff (A) > 0. ’s belief set Bel = {A ∈ A: (A) > 0} is consistent and
deductively closed in the finite/countable/complete sense whenever  is finitely/σ -/completely minimitive. Here Bel is
consistent in the finite/countable/complete sense iff
⋂B = ∅ for every finite/countable/possibly uncountable B ⊆ Bel;
and Bel is deductively closed in the finite/countable/complete sense iff for all A ∈A: A ∈ Bel whenever⋂B ⊆ A for
some finite/countable/possibly uncountable B ⊆ Bel.3
Observation 1. For any ranking space A = 〈W,A, 〉 and all A,B ∈A:
1. min{(A),(A)} = 0.
2. A ⊆ B ⇒ (B) (A).
Rankings κ :L→ N ∪ {∞} on languages L are defined such that for all α,β ∈ L:
0. α  β ⇒ (α) = (β).
1. α  ⊥ ⇒ (α) = ∞.
2.  α ⇒ (α) = 0.
3. (α ∨ β) = min{(α),(β)}.
4. β  ⊥ ⇒ (β | α) = (α ∧ β)− (α) (= 0 if (α) = ∞).
5. β  ⊥ ⇒ (β | α) = ∞.
To be sure:  ⊆℘(L) ×L is the classical consequence relation (and singletons on the left hand side are identified
with the wff they contain). The corresponding definitions and observations for finitely minimitive ranking functions
also apply for rankings on languages. Finally, the minimitivity labels correspond to the additivity labels of probabili-
ties, where it is to be noted that complete additivity does not make sense for probabilities.
3 If possibility theory is interpreted in terms of uncertainty rather than imprecision, one can define a notion of belief—positive degree of necessity,
or equivalently, degree of possibility smaller than 1—that is consistent and deductively closed in the finite, though not in the countable sense.
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In probability theory we can start with a probability Pr on a language L, i.e., a function assigning non-negative
real numbers to all sentences in L such that logically equivalent sentences are assigned the same number, tautologies
are assigned probability 1, and a disjunction of two logically incompatible sentences is assigned the sum of the
probabilities of its two disjuncts. This probability Pr on L induces a finitely additive probability measure, in fact, a
pre-probability Pr∗0 on the fieldA= {Mod(α): α ∈ L} by defining Pr∗0(Mod(α)) = Pr(α). By Carathéodory’s theorem,
Pr∗0 is then uniquely extended to a σ -additive probability measure Pr∗ on the smallest σ -field σ(A) containing A.
More precisely, Carathéodory’s theorem says that whenever we have a pre-probability, i.e., a finitely additive
probability measure Pr∗0 on a finitary field A such that
Pr∗0
(⋃
B
)
=
∑
A∈B
Pr∗0(A)
whenever A contains the union ⋃B of a countable set B of disjoint elements A ∈ A, then we are guaranteed the
existence and uniqueness of a σ -additive Pr∗ on σ(A) that coincides with Pr∗0 on A.
This is different in ranking theory. If we start with a ranking  on a language L, i.e., a function that assigns the
same rank to logically equivalent sentences, that sends contradictions to ∞ and tautologies to 0, and that assigns
to a disjunction as its rank the minimum of the ranks of the two disjuncts, then we also get a finitely minimitive
ranking function, in fact, a pre-ranking ∗0 on A by setting ∗0(Mod(α)) = (α). However, there may be uncountably
many pairs of σ -minimitive (and also completely minimitive) ranking functions ∗1, ∗2 on σ(A) that extend ∗0 ,
i.e., ∗0(A) = ∗1(A) = ∗2(A) for every A ∈ A, but that are not even ordinally equivalent in the sense that there are
B,C ∈ σ(A) such that ∗1(B) ∗1(C) and ∗2(B) > ∗2(C). This is shown by the following example.
Example 1 (No unique extension). The first example shows that a regular pre-ranking cannot always be uniquely
extended to a σ -minimitive ranking function. This means in particular that there need not be a unique pointwise
ranking function inducing a given pre-ranking.
Consider the smallest set of wffs closed under the propositional connectives ¬ and ∧ (with ∨, →, and ↔ defined
in the usual way) and containing the set of propositional variables PV = {pi : i ∈ N}.  on L is defined by assigning
each consistent sentence rank 0, and contradictions are sent to ∞. As mentioned,  induces a finitely minimitive
ranking function ∗0 on A= {Mod(α): α ∈ L} by defining ∗0(Mod(α)) = (α). Indeed, ∗0 is a regular pre-ranking.
Note that for every α ∈ L, Mod(α) ∈A is either empty or uncountable.
The smallest σ -field σ(A) containing A has as elements, among others, the singletons containing ω, for every
ω ∈ ModL, because
{ω} =
⋂{
Mod(α) ∈A: ω |= α,α ∈ L} ∈ σ(A)
(there are but countably many wffs α ∈ L, so this is an intersection of countably many elements of A). Now consider
any of the uncountably many countable subset S of ModL, and let κ be any pointwise ranking function on ModL
such that κ(ω) > 0 for ω ∈ S, and κ(ω) = 0 for ω ∈ ModL \ S. κ(Mod(α)) = 0 = ∗0(Mod(α)) for every non-empty
Mod(α) ∈A, and κ(∅) = ∞ = ∗0(∅).
Still, one might argue, the interesting question is not uniqueness, but whether there exists a pointwise ranking
function that induces the pre-ranking ∗0 one started with. In case of existence, one can further ask whether there is
a unique minimal pointwise ranking function κ∗ that induces the pre-ranking ∗0 , i.e., a pointwise ranking function
κ∗ inducing ∗0 and such that no pointwise ranking function κ with κ(ω) < κ∗(ω), for some ω ∈ W , also induces κ∗0 .
As shown by the following example, one cannot expect there to be a natural pointwise ranking function inducing the
pre-ranking ∗0 , even if ∗0 is regular.
Example 2 (No regular σ -minimitive and no natural pointwise extension). The second example shows that a regular
pre-ranking cannot always be extended to a regular and σ -minimitive ranking function. This means in particular that
a regular pre-ranking need not be induced by a natural pointwise ranking function.
For PV , L, and A as in Example 1, let  be defined as follows:
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(¬pi) = 0,
(±pi1 ∧ · · · ∧ ±pin) =
{
max{(pij ): ±pij = pij ,1 j  n}, if ± pi1 ∧ · · · ∧ ±pin  ⊥,∞, if ± pi1 ∧ · · · ∧ ±pin  ⊥,
(α1 ∨ · · · ∨ αn) = min
{
(αi): 1 i  n
}
,
where max∅ = 0. By putting every wff α ∈ L into disjunctive normal form we get a regular ranking on L, and hence
a regular pre-ranking ∗0 on A. However, in order to extend ∗0 to a σ -minimitive ranking function on σ(A)—and
hence also in order for ∗0 to be induced by a pointwise ranking function on ModL—all but countably many of the
(singletons {ω} containing the) possibilities ω ∈ ModL must be sent to ∞.
This is seen as follows: Every ω ∈ ModL can be represented by an infinite sequence ω = 〈±p1, . . . ,±pn, . . .〉,
where +pn means ω(pn) = 1, and −pn means ω(pn) = 0. If there are infinitely many i ∈ N such that ω(pi) = 1,
then ω must get rank ∞. (Suppose the rank of ω is n < ∞. Then there is m n such that ω(pm) = 1. ∗0(Mod(pm)) =
m+1 > n, although ω |= pm—a contradiction.) So ω has a finite rank only if ω(pi) = 0 for all but finitely many i ∈ N .
For each n ∈ N there are but countably many ωs such that ω(pi) = 1 for exactly n natural numbers i ∈ N . So there
are only countably many ωs with ω(pi) = 1 for all but finitely many i ∈ N , and hence only countably many ωs with
a finite rank.
Still, one might continue to argue, the naturalness of pointwise ranking functions—in contrast to the regularity of
rankings—is too restrictive anyway, and the above example is not sufficient to rule out the existence of an “unnatural”
pointwise ranking function that induces ∗0 . After all, the important thing is that we do not send any consistent sentence
from L or any non-empty proposition from A to ∞, even though we may have to consider some possibilities as
virtually impossible. This is a familiar phenomenon from probability theory, where the Lebesgue measure on the σ -
field of Borel sets over the reals assigns any singleton containing a real number—indeed, any countable set of real
numbers—measure 0, though no non-trivial interval gets Lebesgue measure 0.
So, when we start with a ranking  on L, and thus get a pre-ranking ∗0 on A, is it the case that we always get a
unique minimal pointwise ranking function κ∗ on ModL that induces ∗0 on A, and hence  on L, even though one is
sometimes forced to send some possibilities ω ∈ ModL to ∞? The answer is given by
Theorem 1 (Extension theorem for rankings on languages). Let L be a language, i.e., a countable set of wffs closed
under negation and conjunction, and let  be a ranking on L so that ∗0 is a pre-ranking on the fieldA= {Mod(α): α ∈
L}, where ∗0(Mod(α)) = (α).
Then there is a unique minimal pointwise ranking function κ∗ on ModL that induces ∗0 . That is, ∗0(A) =
min{κ∗(ω): ω ∈ A} for every non-empty A ∈ A; and for every pointwise ranking function κ on ModL such that
κ(ω) < κ∗(ω) for at least one ω ∈ ModL, ∗0(A) = min{κ(ω): ω ∈ A} for some A ∈A.
Proof. Let A1 = Mod(α1), . . . ,An = Mod(αn), . . . be an enumeration of all the countably many elements of A, and
define κ∗n as follows:
κ∗n(ω) = ∗0
(
(±A1 ∩ · · · ∩ ±An)ω
)
,
where (±A1 ∩ · · · ∩ ±An)ω is the unique element of the finite partition
Pn = {±A1 ∩ · · · ∩ ±An} ⊆A
of W = ModL such that ω ∈ (±A1 ∩ · · · ∩ ±An)ω . For each ω ∈ W , κ∗1 (ω), . . . , κ∗n(ω), . . . is a non-decreasing se-
quence of natural numbers, i.e., κ∗m(ω) κ∗n(ω) for m n. κ∗(ω) is defined as the limit of this sequence, if this limit
exists, and as ∞ otherwise, i.e., κ∗(ω) = limn→∞ κ∗n(ω).
We first show that κ∗ is a pointwise ranking function on W , i.e., that at least one ω ∈ W is assigned κ∗-rank 0.
Either ∗0(A1) = 0 or ∗0(A1) = 0. Let B1 = A1, if ∗0(A1) = 0, and B1 = A1 otherwise. Hence
∗(B1) = 0 = min
{
∗(B1 ∩A2), ∗(B1 ∩A2)
}
.0 0 0
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∗0(B1 ∩ · · · ∩Bn−1 ∩An), and Bn = An otherwise. So for each n,
∗0(B1 ∩ · · · ∩Bn) = 0 = κ∗n(ω) for all ω ∈ B1 ∩ · · · ∩Bn.
As κ∗−1n (0) ⊇ B1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bn, for each n, we have κ∗−1(0) =
⋂∞
n=1 κ∗−1n (0) ⊇
⋂∞
n=1 Bn. It remains to be shown that⋂∞
n=1 Bn = ∅. Suppose for reductio that
⋂∞
n=1 Bn = ∅. This means that the set of wffs B = {βi ∈ L: Mod(βi) = Bi} is
inconsistent. By the compactness of classical logic, there is a finite subset Bfin = {βi1, . . . , βin} ⊆ B that is inconsistent,
i.e.,
n⋂
j=1
{
Mod(βij ) ∈A: 1 j  n
}= ∅.
Let m = max{ij : 1  j  n}. Then B1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bm = ∅, and, by construction of the Bi , ∗0(B1 ∩ · · · ∩ Bm) = 0—
a contradiction.
So κ∗ is a pointwise ranking function on W : κ∗ sends at least one ω to 0, but it may send uncountably many ωs to
∞. (For each n ∈ N , κ∗n is a natural pointwise ranking function on W that sends uncountably many ωs to 0.) Let us
show next that κ∗ induces ∗0 , i.e., for every non-empty A ∈A:
∗0(A) = min
{
κ∗(ω): ω ∈ A}.
For every A ∈A there is an mA such that for all nmA, A is equal to the finite union of all (at most 2n) elements of
Pn that are subsets of A. Let ∗0(A) = r ∈ N ∪ {∞}. By finite minimitivity,
∗0(A) = ∗0
(⋃
{±A1 ∩ · · · ∩ ±AmA ∈ PmA : ±A1 ∩ · · · ∩ ±AmA ⊆ A}
)
= min{∗0(±A1 ∩ · · · ∩ ±AmA): PmA  ±A1 ∩ · · · ∩ ±AmA ⊆ A}.
Let D1, . . . ,Dl be the l  2mA disjoint “disjuncts” ±A1 ∩ · · · ∩ ±AmA ⊆ A in this union, and pick any A′ := ±A1 ∩· · · ∩AmA such that ∗0(A) = ∗0(A′). For each n, each of the l · 2n elements of PmA+n whose union is equal to A, and
each i, 1 i  l:
∗0(A) = ∗0(A′) ∗0(Di ∩ ±AmA+1 ∩ · · · ∩ ±AmA+n)
= κmA+n(ω) for all ω ∈ Di ∩±AmA+1 ∩ · · · ∩ ±AmA+n.
As each ω ∈ A is in exactly one Di ∩±AmA+1 ∩ · · · ∩ ±AmA+n we have for every n and every ω ∈ A:
∗0(A) κ∗mA+n(ω) limn→∞κ
∗
n(ω).
If ∗0(A) = ∞, we are already done. So suppose ∗0(A) = r < ∞, whence A is non-empty. As before,
∗0(A) = ∗0(A′) = min
{
∗0(A′ ∩AmA+1), ∗0(A′ ∩AmA+1)
}
.
Let C1 = AmA+1, if ∗0(A′) = ∗0(A′ ∩AmA+1), and let C1 = AmA+1 otherwise. In general, let Cn+1 = AmA+n+1, if
∗0(A′ ∩CmA+1 ∩ · · · ∩CmA+n) = ∗0(A′ ∩CmA+1 ∩ · · · ∩CmA+n ∩AmA+n+1),
and Cn+1 = AmA+n+1 otherwise. Then we have for each n:
∗0(A) = ∗0(A′ ∩C1 ∩ · · · ∩Cn) = κ∗mA+n(ω) = r for all ω ∈ A′ ∩C1 ∩ · · · ∩Cn.
As κ∗−1mA+n(r) ⊇ A′ ∩
⋂n
i=1 Ci , for each n, we have κ∗−1(r) =
⋂∞
n=1 κ∗−1n (r) ⊇ A′ ∩
⋂∞
n=1 Cn. We only have to show
that A′ ∩⋂∞n=1 Cn = ∅; for then κ∗(ω) = r = ∗0(A) for at least one ω ∈ A. As before, suppose for reductio that
A′ ∩⋂∞n=1 Cn = ∅. Then the set of wffs
C = {α′ ∈ L: A′ = Mod(α′)}∪ {γn ∈ L: Cn = Mod(γn), n ∈ N}
is inconsistent. By the compactness of classical logic, there is a finite subset Cfin = {α′, γi1, . . . , γin} ⊆ C that is
inconsistent, which implies that A′ ∩ C1 ∩ · · · ∩ Cm = ∅, where m = max{ij : 1 j  n}. But by construction of the
Cn, 
∗(A′ ∩C1 ∩ · · · ∩Cm) = r < ∞—a contradiction.0
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κ∗(ω) for some ω ∈ W . This means κ(ω) < limn→∞ κ∗n(ω), where κ∗(ω) = ∞ if this limit does not exist. If this limit
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in both cases there is n such that κ(ω) < κ∗n(ω) < ∞. As κ∗n(ω) = ∗0(A′) for that element A′ := ±A1 ∩ · · · ∩±An of
Pn such that ω ∈ A′, we have κ(ω) < ∗0(A′) for some ω ∈ A′ ∈A. Hence κ does not induce ∗0 . 
Theorem 1 is encouraging, but does not extend to pre-rankings on arbitrary fields.
Example 3 (No pointwise extension on arbitrary fields). The third example shows that a regular and σ -minimitive
ranking function on a σ -field cannot always be induced by a pointwise ranking function. This means in particular that
a regular pre-ranking on a field need not be induced by a pointwise ranking function.
Let the σ -field over  be
R= {A ⊆ : A is countable or A is countable},
and let (A) = ∞, if A is empty, (A) = 1 if A is non-empty and countable, and (A) = 0 if A is uncountable.
 is a regular and σ -minimitive ranking function: (∅) = ∞, () = 0, and for every countable B ⊆ R, (⋃B) =
min{(A): A ∈ B}. This is seen as follows: If ⋃B is empty, then so is every A ∈ B; and if ⋃B is non-empty and
countable, then every A ∈ B is countable, and at least one A ∈ B is non-empty. Finally, if ⋃B is uncountable, then at
least one A ∈ B must be uncountable, too.
Clearly  cannot be induced by a pointwise ranking function κ . ({r}) = 1, and so κ(r) = 1 for every r ∈ . But
then min{κ(r): r ∈ } = 1 > ().
Note, though, that Example 3 leaves open the question whether a pre-ranking on a field A can be extended to a
σ -minimitive ranking function on σ(A).
Given that logically equivalent sentences are assigned the same rank, it might seem it should not matter whether
one works with rankings on languages or ranking functions on fields. However, the above shows that this is not quite
correct. The propositions on a set of models ModL induced by the sentences of a language L are not just any subsets of
an arbitrary set of possibilities W—as they often are when one considers measure-theoretic fields in general. Rather,
they come with their own structure—most notably, closure under finite intersections only and compactness—that is
inherited from the structure of L. Ranking functions behave nicely on this structure, but they do not do so in general.
Assuming that we believe in representations of propositions, say sentences, and not propositions themselves—that
is, assuming that belief is a sentential or representational, and not a propositional attitude—and assuming that the
structure of its objects is of importance for the representation of belief, this might be taken to be another reason for
modeling epistemic states by ranking functions.
There are several other areas where one needs finitely minimitive ranking functions. They are a sine qua non
when one wants to have the reals as range (or some other set of numbers that is not well-ordered by the smaller-than
relation <). The reason is that in this case the minimum of a sequence of real-valued ranks need not exist.
As is well known, the lottery-paradox [11] does not arise for ranking functions κ induced by pointwise ranking
functions κ . Considering a lottery with n tickets where exactly one ticket wins, we have as set of possibilities the
set Wn = {ωi : i  n, i ∈ N}, where ωi is the possibility that ticket i will win (the field is the powerset of W ). By
definition, a pointwise ranking function assigns rank 0 to at least one possibility ωi ∈ Wn. Hence one cannot model
the situation that somebody believes of every ticket that it will not win, i.e., κ({ωi}) > 0 for every ωi ∈ Wn. If, on the
other hand, one allows sending all possibilities to a rank greater than 0, then one cannot model the situation that one
believes that some ticket will win, i.e., κ(∅) > 0 and κ(Wn) = 0.
In the finite case this is true for arbitrary ranking functions. However, if we turn to an infinite lottery with countably
many tickets, the set of possibilities is W∞ = {ωi : i ∈ N} (we take as field the powerset of W∞). Now we can send
every singleton {ωi} to a rank greater than 0 and still get a finitely minimitive ranking function that assigns rank 0 to
W∞. For instance, we can assign rank 0 to A whenever A is not finite—say because we go by the slogan: plausibility
is cardinality of the set of possibilities; and whenever A is finite, we assign it the minimum of the ranks ({ωi}), for all
possibilities ωi in A (whatever these singleton ranks are). Then we have a finitely minimitive ranking function that is
compatible with any ranking of the singletons {ωi}. In particular, if we believe, for every ticket in this infinite lottery,
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will win: (∅) = ∞ and (W∞) = 0. This is not possible for a ranking function κ induced by a pointwise ranking
function κ . We can have the above ranking with 0 for every infinite A only if we send at most finitely many ωis to a
rank greater than 0. Similarly for pre-rankings.
4. Probabilities, entrenchments, rankings
Specifying a pointwise ranking function over uncountably many possible worlds is not feasible. In view of this
fact it might be surprising that there are applications in artificial intelligence (e.g. [2,9]) that apparently do work with
pointwise ranking functions. However, these applications actually work with ranking functions on fields, which are
trivially induced by pointwise ranking functions as long as the set of possibilities is finite—and the languages and sets
of possible worlds considered in the above mentioned literature are finite so that each possible world corresponds to a
sentence.
Ranking theory is a middle course between probabilistic and logical approaches to the representation of partial
belief and belief revision—in the sense that ranking functions are measured on a proportional scale, whereas proba-
bilities are measured on an absolute scale, and entrenchments on an ordinal scale.4 In the literature on AGM belief
revision theory [1,6] the objects of belief are sentences—or, because of extensionality, the propositions expressed by
these sentences (though not any sets of possibilities). These logical accounts enable one to express that A is more
entrenched or believed than B , and that B is more believed than C. But in this framework an epistemic agent is not
allowed to quantify the strength of her beliefs. Indeed, she cannot even say that the difference between the strengths
of her beliefs in A and B is greater than the difference between the strengths of her beliefs in B and C. Probabilistic
accounts more or less share the objects of belief (though the focus is more on the semantic side, and any set of pos-
sibilities can be a proposition), but require the epistemic agent to have precise numerical degrees of belief. Ranking
theory is a moderate middle course: The epistemic agent can say whether A is more believed than B and that B is
in turn more believed than C. In addition, the epistemic agent can express that the difference between her grades of
belief in A and B is greater than the difference between her grades of belief in B and C without having to specify
with complete accuracy a numerical degree of belief for each of A,B,C. More precisely, the agent can express her
grades of belief as multiples of some minimally positive grade of belief.5
Given this ranking theory should be welcomed by both subjective probabilists and epistemic logicians. As a matter
of fact, however, neither is the case. Logicians object that it is a mystery where the numbers (ranks) come from (see,
however, [19]), and probabilists complain about the ordinal nature of the ranking apparatus. Yet there is one feature
that is shared by both probabilistic and logical accounts of partial belief and belief revision, but that is not present in
pointwise ranking theory: In both approaches the objects of belief are sentences or propositions, whereas in Spohnian
pointwise ranking theory the objects of belief are the possible worlds one level below. So by formulating ranking
theory in terms of ranking functions on a field and rankings on languages we simultaneously approach probabilistic as
well as logical accounts; and we also get rid of the ideal of specifying a ranking over all possible worlds, a requirement
no real-world epistemic agent could ever meet.6
Continuing this comparison we note that probabilists have the notions of positive and negative relevance and
of independence between propositions, which seem to be of utmost importance.7 Furthermore, they have a way of
revising one’s epistemic state represented by a probability measure over a field A, viz. Jeffrey conditionalisation,
4 I am grateful to an anonymous referee for pressing me further on this point.
5 The epistemic logician will note that the ordering α < β ⇔ (¬α) < (¬β) satisfies all conditions for entrenchment orderings mentioned in
Section 4.2 of [7], with K = {α ∈L: (¬α) > 0}.
6 In his [19] Spohn presents the theory of measurement for his ranking theory, but does so only for the finite case. It should be clear that a theory
of measurement for σ -minimitive, let alone completely minimitive or pointwise ranking functions also covering the infinite case is inapplicable.
One necessary condition for an ordering of disbelief to be represented by a σ -minimitive (or completely minimitive or pointwise) ranking function
is that whenever A is not more disbelieved than any of infinitely many propositions Bi , then A is not less disbelieved than the union
⋃
i∈N Bi of
all these propositions Bi . For finitely minimitive ranking functions and rankings on languages this condition reduces to the following finite version:
Whenever A is not less disbelieved than either one of B and C, then A is not less disbelieved than B ∪C.
7 Conditional probabilistic independence and its (incomplete) axiomatization, the (semi-)graphoid axioms, started to become of interest with
[3,14,15]. Judea Pearl and his group at UCLA started to work with independence in the eighties (e.g. [8,12,13]); for a survey see [18] or [4]. A lot
of work on axiomatizing independence has been done by Milan Studený (e.g. [20]).
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notions of positive and negative relevance and independence nor do they have an appropriate way of updating their
epistemic state represented by a selection function or an entrenchment ordering. Pointwise ranking theory has both
of these desirable features [16], and the question is whether they are preserved when we generalize these to ranking
functions on fields. The answer is that they are. Copying from Spohn [19], A is positively relevant for/independent
of/negatively relevant for B given C in the sense of the ranking function  iff
(A∩B | C)+ (A∩B | C) <=
>
(A∩B | C)+ (A∩B | C).
If  :A→ N ∪ {∞} is the agent’s ranking function on the field A over W at time t , and between t and t ′ the agent’s
ranking function on the field E ⊆ A changes to ′ :E → N ∪{∞}, and the agent’s ranking function does not change on
any field B such that E ⊂ B ⊆ A, then the agent’s ranking function on A at time t ′ should be →′ :A→ N ∪ {∞},
→′(·) = min
{
κ(· | Ei)+ ′(Ei): i ∈ I
}
,
where {Ei ∈ E : i ∈ I } is a partition of W for which there is no finer partition {Ej ∈ E : j ∈ J }, and I, J are any index
sets.
On the other hand, epistemic logicians have the notion of a belief set that is consistent and deductively closed [10].
As shown by the lottery paradox, there is no ε > 0 such that the set of all propositions A with Pr(A)  1 − ε is
deductively closed and consistent. So probabilists lack the notion of a belief set (as long as belief is sufficiently high
degree of belief). Any pointwise ranking function κ gives rise to a belief set Bel = {A ∈ A: κ(A) > 0} which is
consistent and deductively closed in the following complete sense (even if Bel is uncountable): ⋂Bel = ∅, and for
every A ∈A: A ∈ Bel whenever ⋂Bel ⊆ A.
We have already noted in Section 2 that the same holds true for ranking functions on fields, and conclude by
working out this observation for rankings on languages. The belief set Bel = {α ∈ L: (¬α) > 0} induced by a
ranking  on L is consistent and deductively closed in the classical finite sense. If Bel  β , for some β ∈ L, then, by
the compactness of classical logic, there is a finite Belfin ⊆ Bel such that Belfin  β . Let Belfin = {α1, . . . , αn}. Then
¬β  ¬α1 ∨ · · · ∨¬αn. (¬β) (¬α1 ∨ · · · ∨¬αn) by Observation 1 for rankings on languages, and (¬α1 ∨ · · · ∨
¬αn) = min{(¬αi): 1 i  n, i ∈ N} by clause 3 in the definition of rankings on languages. Hence (¬β) > 0, i.e.,
β ∈ Bel. As to consistency, suppose for reductio that Bel is inconsistent. Then Bel  ⊥, which means () > 0—in
contradiction to clause 2 in the definition of rankings on languages.
5. Conclusion
In this paper we have generalized pointwise ranking functions on sets of possibilities to ranking functions on fields
of propositions and rankings on languages. In doing so we have kept the important notions of positive and negative
relevance as well as independence. Through the belief set induced by a ranking function, we also save the link between
belief and degrees of belief—the very feature distinguishing ranking theory from other theories of degrees of belief.8
Finally, Theorem 1 and Examples 1–3 from Section 3 clarify the conditions under which ranking functions and
rankings on languages are induced by pointwise ranking functions.
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